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Abstract
A growing body of literature shows that full-cooperation among farmers to manage pro-
ductive ecosystem services would yield gains with respect to uncoordinated approaches. 
The public good feature of these ecosystem services may, however, hinder the emergence 
of a cooperative solution at the landscape scale. In this paper, we introduce in a coalition 
formation game a spatially-explicit bioeconomic model of fruit pollination, where polli-
naton depends on the distance to the choosen location of natural habitats. We analyse: (i) 
which coalitions are stable; (ii) what benefits they provide; (iii) how cooperation depends 
on the initial landscape structure; and (iv) how policy instruments affect cooperation. The 
theoretical model presents the rationality of cooperation but, due to the detailed heteroge-
neity and complex spatial interactions among farms, we use a numerical example to deter-
mine the stable coalitions. We find that only small coalitions are stable and that the ben-
efits of cooperation decrease when the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase. 
Policy instruments can increase the interest for cooperation but per-hectare payments and 
minimum participation rules may reduce the habitat area at the margin (by decreasing the 
stability of coalitions). Price premium for the coalition members increase the habitat area 
but its budget-effectiveness decreases as the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers 
increase.
Keywords Agri-environmental policy · Biodiversity · Collective incentives · Externalities · 
Pollinators · Spatially explicit spillovers
1 Introduction
The conservation of biodiversity and related ecosystem services (ES) depends on the struc-
ture of landscapes (e.g., density and spatial autocorrelation of natural habitats), which are 
the results of landowners’ land-use decisions (Haines-Young and Potschin 2010). While 
biodiversity conservation benefits society as a whole (Hanley et  al. 2015), some of the 
related ES, such as biological control or pollination, are central for agricultural production 
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(Albrecht et  al. 2020). The economic importance of these productive ES is increasingly 
acknowledged: for example, the French ecosystem assessment estimates that pollinators 
contribute between 5.2% and 12% of the total crop value (Therond et al. 2017). The litera-
ture suggests that farmers can integrate the impacts of their land-use choices on produc-
tive ES to manage them efficiently, i.e. to benefit from additional yields or input-savings 
(Zhang et al. 2007). Some microeconometric studies have suggested that farmers do inte-
grate these effects at the farm scale (Bareille and Letort 2018; Orazem and Miranowski 
1994; Thomas 2003).
Since the provision of many productive ES depends on mobile “ES providers”, such 
as pollinators or pest-predatory insects, farmers’ land-use choices may, however, create 
positive externalities for neighbouring farmers (Bareille et al. 2020; Costello et al. 2017). 
In this context, cooperation among farmers to manage productive ES is likely to be an 
efficient strategy for farmers. Some real-world examples of such cooperative management 
exist,1 in particular with regard to the management of pollination service. Since pollination 
service is a local public good, farmers also face well-known free-riding issues: even if the 
coordinated management of productive ES among farmers should lead to Pareto improve-
ments, its emergence is unikely to occur. Simulations based on bioeconomic models show 
that, indeed, the cooperation of all farmers in a landscape (i.e. the Grand Coalition – GC) 
yields Pareto improvements with respect to the uncoordinated ES management (the Nash 
Equilibrium – NE), but that at least some farmers have incentives to defect (Cong et  al. 
2014; Epanchin-Niell and Wilen 2015). These incentives are even more pronounced when 
farmers are heterogeneous (Atallah et al. 2017; Bareille et al. 2020). However, these papers 
only compare the outcomes of the NE with those of the GC, neglecting the possible sub-
groups of, for example 2 or 3 farmers, which can be formed within a population of N farm-
ers (N > 3). In his seminal paper, Olson (1965) though postulated that small groups would 
be more likely to cooperate as the free-riding problem they face is less signficant.
The literature on coalition formation offers a structure to endogenize the individual 
decision of a farmer to cooperate (Barrett 1994; d’Aspremont et al. 1983). The idea behind 
this literature is that any coalition is feasible in principle (not only the GC or the singletons 
constituting the NE), but that only the stable ones can emerge. A coalition is stable when 
no members have incentives to exit (or deviate from the coalition’s optimum) and non-
members have no incentives to enter. This type of game has been used intensively for the 
analysis of international environmental agreements targetting the provision of global public 
goods (Barrett 1994; Bayramoglu et  al. 2018; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) but also of 
the cooperation amongst firms on R&D investments (Bloch 1995) or on voluntary agree-
ments among firms (Brau and Carraro 2011). More recently, it has been used to assess 
1 For example, the “GIEE” are groups of farms recognised by France to manage natural resources in com-
mon. They receive additional subsidies from European, National or Regional programs. There are about 
500 GIEE in France, with an average size of twenty farmers (Source: https:// agric ulture. gouv. fr/ pres- de- 
10- 000- agric ulteu rs- engag es- dans- les- group ements- dinte ret- econo mique- et- envir onnem ental- giee [last 
read on 02/24/2021]). Further, many French winegrowers manage in common the flavescence dorée, a com-
mon pest for wineyards, in groups organised at the province scale (Constant and Lernould, 2014). Finally, 
some French farmers manage pollination services in common by planting hedgerows in key localizations to 
provide habitats for wild pollinators across the landscape. Information obtained from the French regional 
press; article available (in French) at: https:// www. lepop ulaire. fr/ saint- junien- 87200/ actua lites/ des- agric 
ulteu rs- de- haute- vienne- plant ent- des- haies- pour- les- abeil les- et- les- polli nisat eurs_ 13730 348/ [last read on 
02/24/2021].
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the performance of collective incentives for biodiversity conservation (Ansink and Bouma 
2013; Zavalloni et al. 2019).
The aim of the paper is threefold. First, we seek to determine the size and the composi-
tion of the stable coalitions (SCs) within which farmers are willing to cooperate for the 
provision of pollination service, and to what extent these coalitions yield economic gains 
with respect to the NE. The second objective is to investigate the role of the landscape 
structure on the cooperation and conservation outcomes. The third objective is to assess 
how different public policies targeting habitat conservation affect coalition stability, and 
whether a policy design fostering cooperation among farmers would lead to budget-effec-
tiveness improvements. We examine three different instruments that are often implemented 
in the USA and Europe: (i) individual homogeneous per-hectare payments; (ii) minimum 
participation rules (MPR), where a bonus is paid to each coalition member if the total habi-
tat area exceeds a given threshold; and (iii) price premiums for fruits when pollinators are 
managed in common. We do not aim to find the optimal conservation policy but rather, 
more modestly, the budget-effectiviness of THE different instruments, highlighting some 
possible perverse results of existing policies when coalition formation is addressed. Our 
analysis is valuable for policymakers, in particular in Europe, where a large share of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget is allocated to agri-environmental schemes, 
and where efforts have been made to implement collective incentives (Franks 2019).
For these purposes, we formulate a spatially-explicit bioeconomic model of nine farm-
ers growing annual crops and fruits that can dedicate a share of their arable lands to (semi-)
natural habitats (e.g., set-aside areas, flower strips, hedgerows). Pollinator abundance 
increases the fruit yields but decreases with the distance to the habitats. We first analyti-
cally determine the conservation choices within the alternative coalitions and the impact of 
the considered policy instruments on these choices. However, the spatially-explicit nature 
of the problem prevents us from determining analytically the SCs; we thus numerically 
determine in a second step the SCs over randomly generated landscapes characterised by 
different degrees of spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers. We calibrate the model on 
fruit farms from Emilia-Romagna (Italy).
We contribute to the literature on cooperative management of ES in agricultural land-
scapes in several ways. First, we expand the knowledge on the benefits of cooperative man-
agement for productive ES by accounting for the stability of partial coalitions. For exam-
ple, we find that the GC is never stable without policy intervention, but that some small 
coalitions of two or three farmers can be stable. Albeit small, the emergence of these coali-
tions entails average increases in total profits of 2.5% compared to the NE. Second, most 
of the existing literature has focused on the efficiency or budget-effectiveness of collective 
measures for the provision of unproductive public goods (Bouma et al. 2020; Dupraz et al. 
2009). We here explore the effect of collective measures, and policy instruments in general, 
in the case of a public good that jointly provides non-use values (biodiversity conservation) 
and productive benefits (pollination), i.e. in case of within-group externalities (Kotchen 
and Segerson 2019). This issue has been so far investigated for fishery (Zhou and Seger-
son 2016) and pollution control (Willinger et al. 2014). On biodiversity conservation, few 
papers analyse these collective measures in this context other than in rather abstract ways 
(Ansink and Bouma 2013; Zavalloni et al. 2019). Here, we find that per-hectare payments 
or MPR schemes do not necessarily increase the habitat area when the targeted public good 
also generates within-group externalities. Indeed, these instruments can reduce the stability 
of coalitions that initially conserved more habitats: despite the new incentives, this effect 
can lead to fewer habitats at the margin. Moreover, the price premium may be a budget-
effective instrument to conserve habitats, but only when the spatial autocorrelation of fruit 
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tree covers is low. Finally, very few papers from the coalition formation literature address 
a spatially-explicit distribution of benefits (Alvarado-Quesada and Weikard 2017; Costello 
et al. 2017; Gengenbach et al. 2010) or a high degree of heterogeneity (Bakalova and Eyck-
mans 2019). Contrary to the aforementioned papers, we move closer to reality by mak-
ing endogenous to the model the individual decision on where to implement conservation 
efforts (Busby et al. 2012). We also generalize their approach to the case of the voluntary 
contribution to a public good with (i) heterogeneous agents, (ii) spatial interactions among 
agents and (iii) calibrated data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a general modelling frame-
work to analyse (i) the coalition formation and corresponding land-use decisions and (ii) 
the impacts of the alternative policies on them. Section 3 presents the spatially-explicit bio-
economic model. The results are presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 discusses the results and 
provides concluding remarks.
2  Theoretical analysis
2.1  Model description
In this section, we theoretically describe the short-term maximization problem of farmers 
managing pollination service individually or collectively. Imagine a landscape shared by a 
population of farmers I = {1,…, I}. Without loss of generality, we assume that each farm 
has a single plot of one hectare with an exogenous share fi allocated to fruit production.2 
The remaining available land for each farm i is (1- fi) and can be devoted to annual crops or 
habitats ei. The gross margin of arable crops Πai  is a concave function of the area devoted to 
annual crops (1- fi- ei):
where a = pa ⋅ ya represents marginal revenues (price times yields) and c is the cost 
parameter.3 Such a function is a standard specification in the agricultural economic litera-
ture as it easily describes decreasing return to areas for annual crops (e.g. Heckelei and 
Wolff 2003).
We consider that the fruit gross margin Πf
i
 on farm i depends positively on the abun-
dance of pollinators i on i:
where pf is the fruit price, yf is the reference (exogenous) fruit yield and Cf is the exogenous 
per-hectare cost for fruit production.4 The gross margin Πf
i
 depends on pollination as in 
Cong et al. (2014): a and b are parameters of the yield function such that a + b = 1, where a 
is the share of fruit yield that is independent of pollination and b is the share that depends 












1 − fi − ei
)2
,
(2)Πfi = fi ⋅
(
pf ⋅ yf ⋅
(





2 The assumption of exogeneous fruit area is likely to hold in the short-term.
3 For simplification, we assume that the prices and yields of arable crops are homogeneous among farms.
4 Fruit production is mostly intensive in labour and capital (Silva and Aragão, 2008), which are assumed to 
be exogenous in the short-term.
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The abundance of pollinators i depends negatively on the distance to habitats. For a 
given farm i, the pollinators’ abundance is:
where  is a scale parameter that describes the habitat suitability for the pollinators, dik 
is the distance between two farms and β is a distance parameter such that the pollinators’ 
abundance in i decreases with the distance between i and the habitats in k. A similar eco-
logical function has been used by Cong et al. (2014) building on Lonsdorf et al. (2009). 
Because the pollination service on each farm is affected by the area and location of habitats 
over the entire landscape, the ecological function creates an interdependency among all of 
the farms: the pollination service is a (local) public good.




The chosen functional forms imply that the benefits from pollination enter linearly into 
the profit function, i.e. that pollination presents constant productivity. This is a familiar 
assumption in the literature on public goods, which notably implies orthogonal reaction 
functions in conservation choices among farms. In other words, the contribution to public 
goods by one farm does not affect the contributions of the others (Carraro and Siniscalco 
1993).5
The existing literature on the cooperative management of productive ES only compares 
the NE with the GC outcomes (e.g., Cong et al. 2014). We present these two situations. 
In the NE, each farmer decides on the habitat area, taking into account only her own pay-
offs and taking others’ decisions as given. Each farm i faces the following maximization 
problem:
where the conservation efforts of the farmers other than i are considered fixed. Such an 
equilibrium is determined by computing the first-order conditions (FOC) of equation (4) 
with respect to ei:
where Yf = pf ⋅ yf ⋅ b is the marginal revenues per hectare induced by one pollinator. The 
difference a − c ⋅
(
1 − fi − ei
)
 is the increasing marginal opportunity cost of providing 
habitat on farm i. The opportunity cost depends positively on the fixed fruit area fi and is 
heterogeneous across farms. The term fi ⋅ Yf ⋅  represents farm i’s marginal benefits of 
providing habitats through its indirect effect on pollination, ignoring the productive exter-
nalities generated to other farms. The optimal habitat area for farm i under the NE eN
i
 is 
























pf ⋅ yf ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
a + b ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝














= 0 = −a + c ⋅
(
1 − fi − ei
)
+ fi ⋅ Y
f
⋅ ,
5 A game characterised by non-orthognal reaction functions and heterogenous players game has been 
numericaly assessed by e.g. Osmani and Tol (2010). However, they only consider two-players types. In our 
case, the spatial characteristics of the game makes the population of players fully heterogenous. Thus, we 
choose orthogonal reaction functions to simplify the game structure and focus on the spatial issues.
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A positive solution is obtained when the marginal benefits of habitat are greater than 
the marginal profits of arable lands (in case the area is allocated to arable lands). The entire 
plot is allocated to habitat when the marginal benefits of habitat are higher than the mar-
ginal revenues of arable lands. In other cases, an interior solution is obtained. Equation (6) 
shows that the interior solution eN
i
 decreases with the gross margin of annual crops but 
increases with (i) the reference fruit yield, (ii) the fruit price, (iii) the share of the fruit 
yield that depends on pollination, and (iv) the habitat suitability for pollinators. The influ-
ence of the cost parameter and the fruit area on eN
i
 are more complex and depend on their 
relative values compared to the other parameters.
The optimal landscape in terms of habitat (holding fixed the fruit area) is obtained 
when the sum of the individual profits is maximized. This case is obtained when farms 
cooperate all together within the GC. The optimal habitat areas in such a case are 
obtained by maximizing:
where e is the vector of habitat area for the I farms. The FOC of (7) on ei leads to:
The opportunity cost of providing ei is thus similar to the NE case (equal to 
a − c ⋅
(
1 − fi − ei
)





⋅  ⋅ exp−⋅dik ) 
as farmers internalize the effects of their individual land-use decisions on the others’ 
profits. The optimal habitat area is then:
Similarly to the NE, the solution of the optimal lanscape is bounded by the plot area 
in case the aggregate marginal benefit of habitat are greater then the marginal revenes 
of arable land. Comparing the interior solutions in (6) to (8), we easily find that the GC 
leads to higher levels of habitats than the NE.
2.2  The formation of coalitions for pollination management
We now turn to the case in which a group of farms collectively manage the pollination 
service. There are formally  2I-I non trivial coalitions plus the NE for the population I. To 
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(1994). The first stage is the coalition formation stage: farmers, anticipating the land allo-
cation decisions taken in the second stage, choose to become a member of the coalition 
or not. The coalitions that could emerge are the ones that are both internally and exter-
nally stable. Internal stability implies that no coalition member has incentives to defect 
(the members’ profits are higher inside the coalition than outside). The external stability 
condition postulates that non-members prefer to remain outside the coalitions (the non-
members’ profits are higher outside the coalition). In the second stage, farmers decide on 
the lands allocated to habitat; this decision depends on whether the farm is a member of 
the coalition or not. The usual assumption is that coalition members decide on the public 
good contribution (the habitats) taking into account the aggregate profit accruing to the 
coalition. In contrast, non-members maximize their own individual profit. This coalitional 
equilibrium, where the coalition members maximize the joint profit taking as given the 
non-members’ choices, is called “partial agreement Nash equilibrium” (Chander and Tulk-
ens 1997). In the following, we solve the game using backward induction, starting from the 
second stage.
Call S the vector indicating the composition of a given coalition within the set of the 
 2I-I + 1 possible coalitions. For example, S = (1,1,0,…,0) is the coalition of farms 1 and 2. 
The superscripts s and ns, respectively, indicate whether farm i is part of coalition S or not. 
Assume that farm i belongs to the coalition S. In the second stage, any farm i ∈  chooses 
the habitat areas by maximizing the aggregated profit of the coalition members:
where eS is the vector of the habitat areas for the farms within S. The FOC of (9) on ei leads 
to:
Relation (10) states that the farms within S internalise the externalities they generate to 
other coalition members.6 By contrast, the non-members only internalise their own profits 
and behave as in Eq. (6). It is worth noting that such a spatially-explicit pollination game 
is a positive externality game (Bayramoglu et al. 2018), which implies that the incentives 
for non-members to join the coaliton decrease as the size of the coalition increases (see 
Appendix 1).
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6 Note that S = (1,…,1) leads to the GC outcomes where the landscape is described by Eq. (8). Similarly, if 
the coalition is of size one, relation (10) is identical to (6) and describes the NE.
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The coalitions that spontaneously arise are the ones that respect both the conditions of 
internal stability (relation (11)) and of external stability (relation (12)). For coalition S to 
be stable, the stability conditions imply that all the members of the coalitions have incen-
tives to remain within S (relation (11)), while all of the non-members have incentives to 
remain outside S (relation (12)). We assume that there can be only a single coalition within 
the landscape such that farmers who are not part of S constitute singletons.7
With heterogenous farmers, the analytical assessment of the stability of the coalitions 
– described by relations (11) and (12) – is only possible with strong assumptions and/or 
with high simplifications. With few exceptions (Finus and McGinty, 2019; Weikard et al. 
2015), most of the papers deal with the problem by solving it numerically (Botteon and 
Carraro 1997; Sáiz et al. 2006; Vogt 2016). We embrace this approach (see Sects. 3 and 4).
2.3  Agri‑Environmental Policies
The previous results present the endogenous coalition formation in a no-policy context. 
Farmers have incentives to cooperate to maintain habitats due to THE pollination service 
but, since they do not internalise the external value of conserving habitats (e.g. non-use 
values of pollinators; Hanley et al. 2015), they will underprovide them. In this context, the 
policymakers could provide additional incentives to conserve habitats. The introduction of 
policy instruments that incentivize habitat conservation should affect the farmers’ land-use 
decisions and, ultimately, may influence the farmers’ cooperation decisions. We present the 
impacts of three policy instruments on the cooperation outcomes in the following.
2.3.1  Per‑Hectare Payments
The regulator offers, for any farm i, a per-hectare payment qe for each hectare devoted to 
habitats ei, irrespective of whether farms cooperate or not. In this case, the optimal area 
devoted to habitats by the farmers in S – including the singletons, the GC and all of the 
intermediate coalitions – is obtained by maximizing the aggregated profit of the coalition 
members:
Relation (13) is identical to relation (9) except that it also includes the per-hectare pay-
ments of the coalition members. The FOC of ei for Eq. (13) leads to:
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7 This is an usual assumption in the literature on coalition formation. Although this assumption could be 
relaxed, it would result in a dramatic increase in the possible number of partitions (i.e. the sets of coalitions 
composed of independent farmers).
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As in Eq. (10), the farms within the coalition integrate the externalities they generate to 
other members. However, the farms allocate more habitats in (14) than in (10) due to the addi-
tional payment qe. We call this additional habitat allocation within each coalition the effect at 
the intensive margin. The intensive margin effect, however, also affects the stability conditions 
(11) and (12). Indeed, the modifications of the conserved habitats from (10) to (14) modify the 
profits within the different coalitions such that one coalition that was stable without the per-
hectare payments may no longer be stable with the payment, or the other way around. We refer 
to this effect on the stability of the coalitions as the effect at the extensive margin. Whereas 
the effect at the intensive margin of the per-hectare payment leads necessarily to more habi-
tats, the effect at the extensive margin may result in more or less habitats, depending on if the 
payment fosters or reduces the incentives for cooperation. The total effect of the per-hectare 
payment may thus be positive or negative depending on whether the effects at the extensive 
margin offsets or not the effects at the intensive margin. The extensive margin effect is not 
usually considered in the literature on agri-environmental payments as most of the literature 
deems that farmers have no incentive to conserve habitats – individually or in common – in 
the absence of payments.
2.3.2  Minimum Participation Rule on Natural Habitat Areas
The regulator offers, for any farm i within S, a lump-sum payment QMPR if the total lands 
devoted for habitats by S is higher than a threshold e . This threshold corresponds to a share of 
the total arable lands within the landscape. The farms outside S do not receive any payment. 
The lump-sum payment is paid, individually, to all of the farmers in coalition S if e is reached, 
independently of their individual conservation efforts. Such a scheme has been documented 
by Dupraz et al. (2009) in a French case. In such a setting, the optimal habitat area in any of 
the coalitions is obtained by maximizing:
The MPR introduces a kink in the profit function of the coalition members. The solu-




























































































a + b ⋅
I�
k=1

































a + b ⋅
I�
k=1









 F. Bareille et al.
1 3









 and at e and will choose to enroll an aggregate level of habitat equal to e only if the 
lump-sum payments are high enough to cover the additional costs of selecting a habitat 
size greater than the optimal one in equation (10). Moreover, as is the case for the homog-
enous per-hectare payment, the MPR can either increase or decrease the conservation 
efforts, depending on its effects on the stability of the alternative coalitions. This effet can 
occur even if the threshold is lower than the solution of (15) due to the effects on alterna-
tive coalitions.
2.3.3  Price Premium
The regulator offers, for any farm i in S, a homogeneous price premium  for fruit produc-
tion. The farms outside S do not receive the price premium. This instrument corresponds 
to a particular type of label where the required practice is the cooperative management 
of the pollinators.8 In this setting, the optimal area devoted to habitats in S is obtained by 
maximizing:
The FOC of ei for Eq. (16) leads to:
As in (14), the coalitions conserve more habitats in (17) than in the absence of external 
incentives (as in equation (10)). The price premium thus presents a positive intensive mar-
gin effect. The modifications of the optimal habitat areas from (10) to (17) also change the 
profits of the different coalitions that ultimately affect their stability (at least the external 
stability). There is therefore also an extensive margin effect from the price premium. The 
total effect of the price premium is ambiguous and depends on whether or not the extensive 
margin effects offset the positive effects at the intensive margin. We investigate numeri-
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f
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f










fk ⋅ (1 + 𝜌) ⋅ Y
f
⋅ 𝛼 ⋅ exp−𝛽⋅dik
.
8 This kind of price premium has been examined by Punt and Wesseler (2018) with regard to the formation 
of clubs, the members of which do not produce genetically modified crops.
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3  Numerical Simulations
The theoretical analysis suggests that partial cooperation for pollination service is possible 
in agricultural landscapes and that various policy instruments may foster or decrease interest 
therein. The analytical solutions are, however, impossible to obtain given the considerations of 
the farms’ heterogeneity and the spatially-explicit nature of pollination. We thus illustrate our 
theoretical analysis by formulating a numerical spatially-explicit bioeconomic model. We sim-
ulate the coalition formation process using theoretical landscapes shared by nine fruit farms. 
Contrary to the theoretical model, we consider that each farm owns nine plots of one hectare 
each. The increase in the number of plots per farm from one to nine provides a more realistic 
setting and makes it possible to deepen the investgations on the effects of the landscape struc-
ture. There are thus 9 × 9 = 81 plots within the simulated landscapes and  29–9 + 1 = 504 pos-
sible coalition structures, i.e. partition of farmers when there is only one non-trivial coalition.
Agricultural landscapes present a positive spatial autocorrelation among the covers: neigh-
bouring plots are more likely to present similar covers as they share similar pedoclimatic 
conditions (Pasher et al. 2013). We generate 81 random landscapes such that the Moran’s I 
statistics on the fruit areas take successively the value of 0 (totally random landscape) to 0.8 
(very high spatial autocorrelation), with a step of 0.01.9 To generate comparable landscapes, 
we always attribute a fruit share of 0.01 for the bottom left plot and set the average fruit area 
at the landscape scale at 0.5. We did not generate Moran’s I values higher than 0.8 as real 
landscapes do not seem to exceed such a threshold (Pasher et al. 2013). As in the theoreti-
cal part, the remaining arable areas can either be allocated to habitats or to annual crops.10 
Figure 1 presents the farm localization and the average plot composition of the 81 generated 
landscapes. Figure 1 highlights a spatial clustering where farm f1 presents the lowest amount 
Fig. 1  Location and structure of 
the farms and average fruit area 
per plot




















j wij , N indicates the number of plots and f  is the average fruit cover (Moran, 1948). We used the 
rook matrix to set the weights. In such a case, wij = 1 only if i and j share a common segment – i.e. only if 
they share either the north, south, east or west borders – and wij = 0 otherwise.
10 Note that if we generate the landscapes on the spatial autocorroleation of fruit areas, it also clustered the 
average profitability of annual crop production (see relation (1)).
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of fruit areas and where f5 has, on average, the highest amount of fruits. Figure 7 in appendi-
ces displays the average landscape structure for the different Moran’s I quartiles: it shows that 
the landscapes are more and more clustered as the Moran’s I increases.
In the benchmark setting (without any policy instrument), we first set α = β = 0.2. This 
parametrization ensures that each farm generates externalities to all of the other farms. For 
example, the centroid of farm f1 is located 0.85 km from the centroid of farm f9 (located 
at the other extremity of the landscape – Fig. 1) and, in the case where all farms devoted 
the same amount of habitats, about 15% of the pollination service on f1 depends on farm 
f1′s own choices, while about 9% depends on farm f9’s choices. This figure seems coher-
ent with the observed dispersion of pollinators, which can pollinate up to 1.5 kms from 
their habitats (Zurbuchen et al. 2010). We present the results using this parametrization in 
Sect.  4.1. Section 4.2. is a sensitivity analysis with alternative parametrization, formally 
with α ∈ {0.1,0.2,0.3} and β ∈ {0.1,0.2,0.3}. According to Eq. (3), an increase in β reduces 
the pollinators’ dispersion and the corresponding externalities among farms. On the con-
trary, an increase in α increases the pollinators’ density and the externalities among farms. 
Accordingly, a change in the levels of these parameters may modify our results. Moreover, 
we fix b = 0.1 such that between 5 to 30% of the fruit yields depend on pollination, depend-
ing on the levels of α and β (about 10% in the case of the benchmark). An increase in b 
would thus not be coherent with the observed level of pollination worldwide (Gallai et al. 
2009; Therond et al. 2017). In addition, Cong et al. (2014) showed that their main conclu-
sion was insensitive to the levels of b: all farmers would gain to act cooperatively regard-
less of b. Finally, we calibrate the profitability of annual crops and fruits using the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network for Emilia-Romagna in 2017.11 We simulate the effects of the 
policy instruments using the parametrization of the benchmark in Sect. 4.3.
4  Results
4.1  The Benchmark
Table  1 displays the average outcomes for the 81 simulated landscapes, in term of 
invidivual profits (for the NE, the GC and for the members of the SC with at least two 
members) and cooperation outcomes. As expected, the NE is characterised by the low-
est individual profits. The GC provides the highest individual profits, which are on aver-
age 13.8% higher compared to the NE. However, the GC is not stable and hence cannot 
spontaneously appear. Indeed, there are on average 4.14 SCs per landscape (among the 
504 possible ones), and all of them are composed of two farms. The cooperation among 
farms for the management of pollination is thus limited. Partial cooperation increases 
on average the aggregate profits by 2.5% compared to the NE but are still 9.9% lower 
than the GC (see “Total landscape” in Table 1). For the coalition members, however, the 
individual profits are on average 13.1% higher in the SC than in the NE and only 0.7% 
lower than in the GC (see “Farm average” in Table 1).12
11 Formally, we used πa = 800€/ha, c = 88, πf = 8610€/ha and Cf = 0€/ha. We calibrated the cost parameter c 
such that the average observed wheat gross margins in Emilia-Romagna equal the average gross margins in 
our theoretical landscapes.
12 Interestingly, the average individual profits for coalition members can be higher within the SC than 
within the GC, e.g. for (corner) farms f1, f3 and f7. This reason illustrates the unstability of the GC in our 
settings.
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The farm’s fruit area and location affect its probability of choosing to become a coali-
tion member. Indeed, the central farm (f5) is the most frequent member of the SCs (with 
its neighbour f6) and the one that benefits the most from cooperation (Table 1). The corner 
farms (except farm f9) are the least frequent members of the SCs. In particular, farm f1, 
for which the fruit area is the lowest, is the farm that cooperates the least. Its neigbours, f2 
and f4, also cooperate significantly less than their symmetric equivalents f6 and f8, which 
is proably due to the lowest amount of fruit areas at there disposal (see Figure 7 in Appen-
dix). Similarly, farm f9 cooperates more than farms f2 and f4 despite its corner position, 
likely because it has more fruit areas.
Figure 2 presents the share of arable land allocated to habitats for each plot in the dif-
ferent situations. In line with Table 1, the NE is characterised by the lowest habitat area 
(57.68%), whereas the GC would allocate all arable lands to habitats. The landscapes 
with at least one SC lead to higher habitat areas than the NE (65.06% on average). Fig-
ure  2 shows that while the central farm tends to free-ride in the NE by benefiting from 
Table 1  Average profits in the NE, GC and SCs and features of the SCs (N = 81)
The results are computed based on the average of the 81 randomly simulated landscapes. The standard 
deviations are within brackets. “Number SC” indicates how many non-trivial SCs, per simulated landscape, 
each farmers is member of (or the average number of possible SCs for the line “total landscape”). “Size 
SC” indicates the average size of the SCs in which each farmer is member. The line “farm average” pre-
sents the average figures of the nine farms for all characteristics; in particular, the average profit in the SC 
is computed on the coalition members. The line “total landscape” presents the sum over the nine farmers; 
in particular, “Profit SC” includes the profits of the members and the non-members. The used pollination 
parameters are α = β = 0.2. There is no policy in the benchmark
Profit NE (€) Profit GC (€) Profit SC (€) Number SC Size SC
f1 30,863 33,793 44,958 0.17 2.00
(11,009) (13,581) (4,763) (0.70) (0.00)
f2 40,149 45,893 49,359 0.73 2.02
(11,521) (14,340) (5,121) (1.37) (0.13)
f3 41,333 46,383 46,424 0.90 2.00
(9,075) (11,117) (3,711) (1.34) (0.00)
f4 42,041 48,292 47,617 0.75 2.02
(10,395) (13,025) (5,432) (1.37) (0.00)
f5 48,814 57,594 50,244 1.41 2.00
(11,131) (14,205) (5,463) (2.05) (0.00)
f6 47,032 54,054 49,003 1.43 2.00
(11,042) (13,714) (5,225) (1.79) (0.00)
f7 42,472 47,724 47,802 0.81 2.02
(11,035) (13,492) (6,111) (1.24) (0.00)
f8 44,532 50,856 47,921 1.11 2.00
(10,455) (12,833) (5,089) (1.70) (0.00)
f9 44,186 49,511 47,870 0.96 2.00
(10,327) (12,430) (5,407) (1.34) (0.00)
Farm average 42,380 48,233 47,911 0.92 2.01
(5,121) (6,593) (1,572) (1.08) (0.01)
Total landscape 381,424 434,099 390,987 4.14 2.00
(2,423) (1,145) (2,620) (5.00) (0.00)
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neighbouring farms’ choices, it is the one that allocates the highest share of land to habitats 
within the SCs. The corner farms (except farm f9) are the ones that put the least number of 
habitats within the SCs. In particular, f1 puts the least effort in the coalition as it is the farm 
with the least fruit area and thus with the least potential gains from cooperation.
We further deepen the relationships between cooperation and the landscape structure 
in Fig. 3. First, the number of SCs clearly decreases as the fruit areas are more spatially 
clustered (Fig. 3a). While there are up to 17 SCs for landscapes with low spatial autocor-
relation (with a Moran’s I lower than 0.2), there are almost no SC for landscapes with 
high spatial autocorrelation. Indeed as fruits are more and more clustered, the number of 
farms that benefit the most from cooperation reduces, which decreases the number of SCs. 
Second, it seems that there is no clear relationship between coalition size and landscape 
structure: the SCs are of size two, whatever the level of spatial autocorrelation (Fig. 3b). 
This result is similar to Alvarado-Quesada and Weikard (2017) who find that 2-player coa-
litions are the only stable ones under a wide range of parameter levels. Third, 64% of these 
SCs are composed of neighbouring farms (Fig. 3c). This feature is highly variable among 
the landscapes but does not depend on the landscape structure, except to the extent that the 
variance increases with spatial autocorrelation. Fourth, the ratio of the aggregated profit 
of the GC over the aggregated profit in the NE varies between 1.127 and 1.160 (Fig. 3d) 
but does not seem to depend on the spatial structure.13 On the contrary, there is a negative 
relationship between, on one hand, the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers and, on 
the other hand, the ratio of the aggregated profits within landscapes with a SC over those in 
the NE (Fig. 3d). Not only the probability to cooperate decreases with the spatial autocor-
relation of fruit tree covers but the benefits within the SC decreases too. Fifth, the mem-
bers of the SCs have significantly more fruits than the non-members (Fig. 3e).14 This is 
coherent with the literature on coalition formation: the players with the highest gains from 
cooperation (farms with the largest fruit areas, hence those that have greatest to gain from 
an increased pollination service) are the ones who are the most willing to cooperate, on 
average. Interestingly, coalition members are characterised by higher shares of fruits as the 
spatial autocorrelation increases. This feature may have the same cause than the decreas-
ing number of SCs as the spatial autocorrelation increases: a landscape with high spatial 
Fig. 2  Average habitats as shares of arable land over the 81 simulations for a the NE, b, the SC and c the 
GC
13 This ratio is often used as an indicator to determine the potential benefits of cooperation (Finus and 
McGinty, 2019).
14 On average, the members have 57.14% of their lands for fruits while 47.95% of the non-members’ lands 
are for fruits.
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autocorrelation is characterised by farms with very different levels of fruit and arable areas, 
which complexifies the possibility to find a mutually beneficial agreement among farms. 
Finally, the members of the SCs devote all of their arable lands to habitats while habitats 
occupy 54.92% of the non-members’ arable lands (Fig. 3f), i.e. a bit less than in the NE 
(Fig. 2). Overall, greater benefits from cooperation entail greater contributions to habitats 
from the coalition members but, hence, higher positive spillovers that incentivizes farmers 
to free-ride. This mechanism is behind the “paradox of cooperation” (Barrett 1994), which 
describes how great potential gains from cooperation actually limit the size of the SCs.
4.2  Sensitivity Analysis on Pollinator Abundance
To check the robustness of our results, we solve the model using alternative values for α 
and β. Table 2 displays the cooperation outcomes for the alternative parametrizations. The 
sensitivity analysis confirms that there are few SCs per landscape, on average, and that the 
GC is never stable. The SCs are small (about two or three members – see Fig. 8 in Appen-
dix 3) and mostly composed of neighbouring farms. In other words, an increase in β tends 
to increase the SC size, while an increase in α decreases the SC size: in both cases, an 
increase in the pollinator density decreases the SC size.
The number of SCs is not related to β and evolves non-linearly with α. Its maximum 
is reached for α = 0.2 (see Fig. 9 in Appendix). This may illustrate that farmers have few 
incentives to cooperate both for low levels of α (due to the low pollinator density) and for 
high ones (high incentives to free-ride). In particular, setting α = 0.3 does not allow for the 
emergence of any SCs within the vast majority of the simulated landscapes (see Fig. 9 in 
Appendix 3). The number of SCs decreases as the concentration of fruits increases but the 
relationship seems weaker than in the benchmark (see Fig. 9 in Appendix 3).
Finally, Table 2 compares the potential gains from full-cooperation compared to the NE. 
Overall, the total profits in the GC are 5.5% to 19.7% greater than in the NE and their 
ratio is positively correlated to the number of SCs. The potential gains from cooperation 
decrease with α: cooperation is particularly interesting when the density of pollinators is 
low (see also Figure 10 in Appendix). Figure 10 illustrates that the potential gains from 
cooperation increases as the spatial autocorrelation increases, at least for medium and high 
α and medium and low β (i.e. when the pollinator abundance increases). The potential ben-
efits are remarkably stable over the different landscapes when the density of pollinator is 
low (see  Figure 10). Given that our main results remain identical among the alternative 
parametrizations of the ecological function, we keep α = β = 0.2 for the following.
4.3  Policy Instruments
4.3.1  Per‑Hectare Payments
Table 3 displays the conservation and cooperation outcomes for the per-hectare payments 
from €0/ha to €300/ha. As expected, the payments tend to increase the average total profits 
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and habitat areas. The total profit increases as the subsidies increase, but more than the 
total payments. For €300/ha, the total payments represent €10,790 (i.e. 2.5% of the total 
profit) while the profits increased by €46,532 compared to a non-policy context. The new 
incentives lead to more habitats that provide additional pollinators and, ultimately, increase 
the fruit profitability for all of the farms.
The per-hectare payments reduce the incentives to cooperate for the pollination service 
(Table 3): there is a continuous decrease in the number of SCs from €0/ha (4.14 SCs per 
landscape) to €120/ha (0.78 SCs per landscape). After this level, there are almost no more 
SCs. The SCs remain of size two. The difference in profits between members and non-mem-
bers decreases as the payments increase (and even becomes negative as the rare SCs are com-
posed of farm f1), which underpins the lower willingness to cooperate. This loss of interest 
in cooperation is due to two combined factors. First, the public payments benefit both the 
members and non-members. If high enough, the payments reduce the gap between the profits 
of the members and non-members, and the stability conditions are affected. Second, the addi-
tional habitats increase the pollination service, which decreases the interest in the cooperative 
management of pollinators: farmers tend to free-ride on the contributions of the others.
Figure 4 displays the evolution of the average habitat area depending on the payments. 
It illustrates that the habitat area moves closer from the SC to the NE as the payments 
increase between €0/ha to €140/ha (because the number of SC decreases – see Table 3). 
Indeed, as there are no more SCs after €140/ha (except for 2 to 6 of the 81 simulated land-
scapes – see Table 3),15,16 the only possible landscapes after this threshold are the ones 
under the NE, which are characterised by the smallest habitat area. As a result, we observe 
a small decrease in the average habitat area in this payment range. Thus, even if the per-
hectare payment increases the habitat area within the NE, the average effect of the payment 
is locally negative because the payment decreases the stability of coalitions that initially 
conserved more habitats. In other words, the extensive margin effect offsets the intensive 
margin effect in this range of payments. The per-hectare payment needs to be at least €165/
ha to reach again the levels reached at €140/ha (Fig. 4). Finally, there is no clear relation-
ship between the spatial structure and the cooperation outcomes (not displayed). The main 
difference with Sect. 4.1. is that the SCs are exclusively composed of neighbours.
4.3.2  The Minimum Participation Rule
Table 4 displays the results for the MPR simulations. The MPR scheme is composed of a 
lump-sum payment QMPR that is paid if the amount of habitats within the coalition exceeds 
the threshold e . Because the minimum threshold that we consider is e = 20% , the MPR 
does not affect the NE outcomes (the size of a single farm is smaller than the threshold). 
Fig. 3  a number of SCs per landscape, b size of the SCs, c share of the SCs composed only of neighbour-
ing farms, d ratio of the total profits of the GC over the NE (full black dot) and ratio of the average total 
profits of the SCs over the NE (open black dot), e share of fruits for members of SCs (full black dot) and for 
the non-members (open black dot) and f share of arable plots devoted to habitats crops for the SC members 
(full black dot) and for the non-members (open black dot) as a function of the landscape’s Moran’s I. The 
standard deviations are displayed in the bar when appropriated and are clustered on the landscape’s SCs 
▸
15 These landscapes are characterized by a Moran’s I higher than 0.2.
16 Note that, if this threshold appears to be €140/ha on Fig. 4, this threshold is reached for per hectare pay-
ments of about €60/ha in some simulated landscapes.
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The MPR scheme could, however, affect the formation of larger coalitions. Indeed, a low 
MPR threshold (20%) decreases the external stability of the 2-farmers coalitions, which 
are no longer stable (Table 4). They are replaced by larger coalitions, which grow as the 
lump-sum payment increases but which are less frequent. The GC is even reached for a 
lump-sum payment of €800 in some of the simulated landscapes. These new coalitions 
usually conserve more habitats than the initial coalitions (for lump-sum payments higher 
than €500), but also sometimes less (for lump-sum payments equal to €200). As for the 
per-hectare payments, an increase in the lump-sum payments can thus decrease the con-
served habitats at the margin. After a threshold, an increase in the lump-sum payments 
increases the conservation efforts, at least when e is low.
The effects of the lump-sum payments depend indeed on the levels of e . For example, 
the coalitions of two or three farmers cannot easily reach a threshold of 50% or 80% and 
Table 2  Number and size of the 
stable coalitions for alternative 
parametrizations of the 
ecological function (N = 81)
The displayed figures are the averages over the 81 simulated land-
scapes. The standard deviations are within brackets and are clustered 
at the landscape level. “Number SC” is the number of SCs per simu-
lated landscape. “Size SC” provides information on the average num-
ber of members per SCs. “Share neighbours in SC" presents the share 
of the SCs composed exclusively of neighbours. “Profits GC/ Profits 
NE” is the ratio of the total profit at the landscape scale for the GC 
over the NE





α = 0.1 and β = 0.1 2.19 2.00 0.66 1.197
(1.65) (0.00) (0.29) (0.001)
α = 0.2 and β = 0.1 0.84 2.00 0.72 1.148
(4.13) (0.00) (0.34) (0.017)
α = 0.3 and β = 0.1 0.00 – – 1.055
(0.00) (0.031)
α = 0.1 and β = 0.2 0.74 2.25 0.67 1.108
(0.89) (0.39) (0.40) (0.001)
α = 0.2 and β = 0.2 4.14 2.00 0.64 1.138
(5.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.006)
α = 0.3 and β = 0.2 0.05 2.00 1.00 1.065
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.020)
α = 0.1 and β = 0.3 0.26 2.81 0.73 1.055
(0.65) (0.40) (0.44) (0.001)
α = 0.2 and β = 0.3 2.84 2.04 0.74 1.113
(2.12) (0.15) (0.26) (0.004)
α = 0.3 and β = 0.3 0.02 2.00 0.50 1.071
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.012)
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are thus not affected by the scheme. More specifically, these coalitions are not easily dis-
rupted by the lump-sum payments and hence mostly remain stable (Table 4). Because high 
threshold levels do not easily undermine the external stability of the existing SCs, setting 
overly high threshold levels do not yield results that are substantially different from the 




















Fig. 4  Average share of arable lands covered by habitats according to per-hectare payments within all SCs 
(solid line), the Nash equilibrium (dotted line) and the SCs with at least two farmers (dashed line)
Table 4  Total profits, payments and habitats, individual profits (for members and non-members) and coali-
tion structure according to the MPR threshold rates and lump-sum payments (N = 81)
The information was computed on average over the 81 landscapes and over the SCs (including the NE for 












Habitat share Number SC Size SC
0 € 389,364 48,359 42,078 0 0.50 4.14 2.00
MPR threshold of 20%
€ 200 385,491 54,487 36,054 300 0.46 0.80 3.59
€ 500 393,276 52,351 31,838 1,444 0.53 1.00 5.78
€ 800 400,453 51,370 27,434 2,883 0.59 1.00 7.21
€ 1 100 404,964 51,012 24,357 4,318 0.63 1.00 7.85
MPR threshold of 50%
€ 200 389,355 48,379 42,072 0 0.50 4.12 2.00
€ 500 391,424 49,371 41,537 310 0.52 4.65 2.52
€ 800 394,266 49,696 41,286 919 0.54 5.06 3.00
€ 1 100 395,713 49,664 41,397 1,403 0.55 5.09 3.14
MPR thresold of 80%
€ 200 389,355 48,379 42,072 0 0.50 4.12 2.00
€ 500 389,620 48,455 42,045 29 0.50 4.16 2.06
€ 800 392,187 48,823 41,918 439 0.53 4.49 2.51
€ 1 100 394,443 49,105 41,833 1,006 0.54 4.75 2.84
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MPR rate from 20% to 50% or 80% decreases on average the habitat area: the rare new SCs 
initially conserved less habitats than the original SCs. The additionality of lump-sum pay-
ments is thus higher for low threshold levels. Finally, it should be noted that the MPR can 
also – slightly – increase the profitability of farming. For example, the profits (excluding 
payments) increase by about 0.1% in the case of the €500 lump-sum payment coupled with 
a MPR rate of 0.8 compared to the benchmark case.
4.3.3  The Price Premium for Cooperative Management
Table 5 displays the results for the simulations with the price premium, from + 0% to + 5% 
of the initial price. An increase in the premium decreases the number of SCs as the added 
value of cooperation created by the price premium undermines the external stability of 
many coalitions, but quickly increases their size. As expected, the price premiums increase 
the average total profits, in particular those of the coalition members (by design, the price 
premium does not directly affect the profits of singletons). Interestingly, the average habitat 
area decreases from a premium of 0% to 0.5% due to the higher amplitude of the negative 
effect at the extensive margin (the disruption of the original SCs) compared to the benefi-
cial effect at the intensive margin. The GC starts to be the unique SC in some landscapes 
for premiums of 1.5%. The GC remains the single SC for 29 of the 81 simulated landscapes 
for a price premium of 5%, and in this case, all arable lands are devoted to habitats. Finally, 
we find that price premiums increase the average profitability of farming (since the price 
premiums are higher than 1.5%): the profits without the premiums are higher than in the 
Benchmark. This result is stronger and more robust than with the MPR program, but less 
than the per-hectare payments.
Contrary to the other instruments, the effect of the price premium on the cooperation 
outcomes is affected by the landscape structure. For example, for a price premium of 5%, 
the GC is stable in 62% of the landscapes in the first spatial autocorrelation quartile (for a 
Moran’s I between 0 and 0.2), in 45% of the landscapes in the second quartile, in 25% of 
the landscapes in the third quartile and only in 10% of the landscapes in the fourth quartile 
(for a Moran’s I between 0.61 and 0.8). Indeed, because the price premium only affects the 
gains for cooperating farms and as the potential gains from cooperation are less impor-
tant for high spatial autocorrelation (see Sect. 4.1.), the GC is more likely to be stable for 
low Moran’s I. This is particularly true for low price premiums. For example, the GC is 
stable 10 times for a price premium of 2.5%, but only for Moran’s I lower than 0.2. At a 
similar premium level and when the Moran’s I is higher than 0.6, farms f1, f2 and f3 do not 
cooperate with the others, as these farms present sensibly lower levels of fruits when the 
spatial autocorrelation is high. Because the price premium depends heavily on the coopera-
tion processes, its increase thus affects differently the conservation outcomes depending on 
the spatial structure.
4.3.4  Budget‑Effectiveness of the three Instruments
Tables  3, 4, 5 display the detailed responses to the different policies in terms of land-use 
choices within the coalitions (the intensive margin effects) and the stability of the alterna-
tive coalitions (the extensive margin effects). However, the results are available per levels of 
payments, which prevents simple comparisons of the budget-effectiveness of the alternative 
instruments. Figure 5 displays the share of habitats at the landscape scale according to the 
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total expenditures of the alternative policies. Compared to Tables 4 and 5, we only display the 
results for the SCs with at least two farmers for the collective instruments (i.e. the MPR and 
the price premium).17,18 The MPR with a threshold e of 20% is the most efficient instrument 
on average (Fig. 5). This is due to the highest extensive margin effect for these levels of lump-
sum payments and this threshold level. However, increasing the threshold levels decreases the 
budget-effectiveness of the MPR because the previously stable coalitions cannot reach e and 
remain insensitive to the increase in the payments. In terms of budget-effectivenness, the MPR 
with high thresholds are the worst simulated instruments. This illustrates, if needed, the care-
ful attention that is required by policymakers to design policy instruments. The per-hectare 
payments have an intermediate budget-effectivenness. Interestingly, the evolution of the habi-
tat area with the aggregated payments display a similar pattern to the one in Fig. 4, with a 
temporary drop when the initial SCs are disrupted by the payments. The price premium is, on 
average, almost as efficient as the per-hectare payments.
Figure 6 plots the total habitats according to the total payments in the four quartiles of 
Moran’s I. The spatial correlation of the fruit areas affects the budget-effectiveness of the 
policy instruments. First, if the MPR with low thresholds are always the most budget-effec-
tive instrument and the MPR with high thresholds are always the worst ones, an increase in 
the fruit concentration reduces the budget-effectiveness of the MPR with low thresholds, but 
increases the budget effectiveness of the MPR with high thresholds. Second, the budget-effec-


























Fig. 5  Average share of arable lands devoted to habitats according to the total payments (in €), the per-
hectare payments (dotted line), the price premium (dashed line), the MPR with a threshold of 20% (solid 
grey line) and the MPR with a threshold of 50% (solid black line). The averages were computed on the 81 
simulated landscapes and on (i) the SCs with at least two farmers for the MPR and price premium, and (ii) 
all SCs for the per-hectare payments (which also include the NE) 
17 Indeed, because the NE is a stable equilibrium that does not respond to the MPR and the premium, the 
average outcomes over the SCs tends to be smoothed. In contrast, we keep the NE outcomes for the per-
hectare payments as the NE remains the single stable equilibrium in the majority of landscapes after levels 
of €140/ha.
18 We do not plot the MPR with a threshold of 80% as the curve is almost identical to the MPR with a 
threshold of 50%.
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The temporary drop appears earlier in the total payments as spatial autocorrelation increases, 
suggesting that SCs are distrupted for smaller payments as the fruit concentration increases. 
Finally, the budget-effectiveness of the price premium decreases as spatial autocorrelation 
increases, and to a higher extent than the other instruments. In particular, while its budget-
effectiveness is sensibly higher than the per-hectare payments for low spatial autocorrelation 
(and about the same than the MPR with low rate – see Fig. 6a), it is less efficient for high spa-
tial autocorrelation (Figs. 6c, d). The interest in the price premium decreases as the fruits are 
more and more concentrated.
5  Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Agricultural production depends on the provision of productive ES that, in turn, are 
affected by the landscape-scale land use decisions of the same farmers that benefit from 
them. The literature highlights how the efficient provision of these ES would require the 
cooperation of all of the farmers in the area. Yet, being delivered by mobile ES providers 
such as pollinators, cooperation for their conservation is hindered by free-riding problems. 
Most of the literature has, however, either assumed full- or non-cooperation, ignoring the 
possibility of partial cooperation. In this paper, we assess to what extent partial coopera-
tion among farmers on pollination management can emerge (in terms of number, size, and 
composition of the SCs) and how policy instruments can foster it. To do so, we introduce 
a spatially-explicit bioeconomic model of pollination within a coalition formation game. 
We also contribute to the literature on coalition formation by considering the case in which 
the levels of the public good (pollination here) differ within the landscape and among the 







































































































Fig. 6  Average share of arable lands devoted to habitats according to the total payments (in €), the per-hec-
tare payments (dotted line), the price premium (dashed line), the MPR with a threshold of 20% (solid grey 
line) and the MPR with a threshold of 50% (solid black line) for a the first quartile, b the second quartile, c 
the third quartile and d the fourth quartile of Moran’s I. The averages were computed on the 81 simulated 
landscapes and on (i) the SCs with at least two farmers for the MPR and price premium, and (ii) all SCs for 
the per-hectare payments (which also includes the NE) 
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by considering cases of pure public good, which, by definition, is identical across agents 
and localizations.
Specifically, our results show that only 0.25% to 0.75% of the possible coalitions are 
spontaneously stable within the generated landscapes (without any public intervention). 
Depending on the parametrization of the pollinators’ abundance function, the SCs are com-
posed of two or three farmers (out of nine) and are mainly composed of neighbours. The 
coalition members allocate all of their arable land to habitats, while the non-members still 
grow annual crops. Not surprisingly, the farmers that have the highest willingness to coop-
erate are the ones with the largest fruit areas. The central farm has the highest willingness 
to cooperate, ceteris paribus. We find that average total profits increase by about 2.5% in 
the landscapes with a SC, compared to the NE landscapes. Furthermore, despite that the 
GC leads to the highest total profit, it is never stable without policy intervention. This is a 
crucial result as the existing studies have assumed its stability (Atallah et al. 2017; Bareille 
et al. 2020; Cong et al. 2014; Epanchin-Niell and Wilen 2015). Overall, the cooperation for 
the management of productive ES is possible, but remains partial.
Endogenizing the choice of cooperating is particularly valuable to assess the budget-
effectiveness of agri-environmental policy instruments. Indeed, policy instruments affect 
the land-use choices of the farmers within one given coalition (i.e. the effect at the inten-
sive margin), but also their choices to join a coalition (i.e. the effect at the extensive mar-
gin). Accordingly, we provide new insights on usual conservation instruments when the 
targeted habitats support both public good valued by society (the existence value of bio-
diversity) and farmers (the pollination service). First, we find that an increase in the per-
hectare payments does not necessarily lead to more conserved habitats. Indeed, the inten-
sive margin effect may be offset by the extensive margin effect for some payment levels: 
the per-hectare payments disrupt the stability of coalitions that initially conserved more 
habitats. This is a striking result as the literature usually ignores the extensive margin effect 
of policy instruments on cooperation for productive ES and, as a result, finds that the per-
hectare payments always increase the conservation of habitats. Second, we find that setting 
a high MPR threshold may be counterproductive as SCs are not disrupted by the lump-
sum payments; policymakers should instead take advantage of the coalition formation pro-
cess to foster conservation. Indeed, setting a MPR threshold at a level close to the one 
reached within the existing SCs decreases their external stability and fosters the creation 
of larger coalitions that conserve more habitats. This result does not appear in the literature 
on MPR schemes as the authors assume the stability of the GC (e.g., Dupraz et al. 2009). 
On average, the MPR with a low threshold is the most efficient instrument, but needs to 
be carefully designed. Finally, our paper provides an evaluation of the budget-effective-
ness of a price premium for farms involved in cooperative pollination management. To our 
knowledge, such an instrument has not been studied previously in the literature despite 
some examples of its utilization in real life settings.19 Our simulations illustrate that the 
price premium increases the stability of large coalitions (in particular the GC), leading to a 
high level of conserved habitats. All of the simulated instruments improve the agricultural 
19 A similar scheme is used by some food companies, such as Barilla® in Italy or LU® in France, to main-
tain wild pollinators (independently of cooperative management though). These companies increase their 
product price so that the additional benefits are redistributed to their suppliers – i.e. the farmers – that grow 
flowers on parts of their arable lands.
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profitability in some range of payments, by fostering the stability of large Pareto-improving 
coalitions that provide more pollinators.
Our work also explores the role of the landscape structure on the cooperative outcomes 
and the resulting conserved habitat and agricultural profitability. We generated landscapes 
with half of the area devoted to fruits but for which the spatial autocorrelation differed 
(with Moran’s I going from 0 to 0.8). We find that the number of SCs and the cooperation 
benefits decrease as the spatial autocorrelation increases. The spatial autocorrelation also 
affects the effectiveness of the policy instruments, in particular the price premium, which is 
more effective than the per-hectare payments for low spatial autocorrelation, but less effec-
tive when the spatial autocorrelation is high.
If our method presents some advances with regard to the existing literature, our work 
still suffers from several limitations. First, we have considered a short-term maximization 
and ignored the dynamic of pollinator abundance and related long-term choices. In particu-
lar, we have assumed that the area devoted to fruits was exogeneous. However, the increase 
in the pollinator density under cooperative management increases the profitability of fruit 
production and thus should provide incentives to farmers to increase the fruit areas in the 
long-term. Second, we did not account for coordination costs. To our knowledge, these 
costs have never been accounted for in the literature on the coordinated management of 
mobile ES providers. The integration of coordination costs are, however, suspected to affect 
the stability of the different coalitions (Banerjee et  al. 2017). Third, we only considered 
policy instruments that reward the farmers individually for their collaborative performance 
(e.g. the MPR or the price-premium). We did not analyse any instruments that reward col-
laborative solutions per se by providing an aggregated payment for the group (Kotchen 
and Segerson 2019). Such types of payments would, however, raise the additional question 
of the distribution of the payments among the SC’s members (Drechsler 2017). The pos-
sibility for side-payments, with or without any policy instruments, is suspected to modify 
our conclusions as it would increase the stability of the biggest coalitions, even with het-
erogeneous agents (Bakalova and Eyckmans 2019). Finally, we have assumed that the pro-
ductivity of pollination was constant, entailing orthogonal reaction function. This implies 
that farmers’ choice of land allocation is not affected by the choice of the other farmers. 
Even if this assumption is not uncommon, diminishing returns to pollinations arise in real 
landscapes, which should change the cooperation outcomes. In particular, a two-farmers 
coalition should no longer be stable, but replaced by NE or by larger coalitions (Carraro 
and Marchiori 2002). The effect of the policies might also differ accordingly. There is thus 
noteworthy space for improvement and future studies on the cooperative management of 
productive ES should focus on these dimensions.
Cooperative Management of Ecosystem Services
1 3
Appendix A
To prove that the game is a positive externality game, consider a non-coalition member h. 
For any h ∉ S, the utility for a non-coalition member i ∉ S when the coalition composition 
is S is (slightly reshaping for clarity Eq. (9)):
In (A.1) ens
i
 is the own contribution to the pollinator habitat of farmer i, the second term 
within brackets is the contribution of the coalition members, and the third and fourth terms 
are, respectively, the contribution of non-members excluding farmer h, and the contribu-
tion of the non-coalition member farmer h.




(S ∪ h) , i.e. the coalition size and composition do not 





(S ∪ h) . Compare (13) with:




 . Finally, note that Πns,∗
i
( ∪ h) is given by:
As the optimal land allocated to habitat for non-member of the coalition is not affected 
by the coalition size, the only differences between (A.3) and (A.1) are in the terms within 
brackets. The first and the third terms inside the brackets are the same in the two equa-




( ∪ h) (see rela-
tion (19)). And the fourth term within brackets is also greater in (20) than in (18). Thus, 
Πn,∗
i
( ∪ h) > Πn,∗
i
() and the game is a positive externality game.
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Appendix C
Sensitivity analysis for the pollinators’ aundance function (Figs. 8, 9, 10).
Fig. 7  Average fruit area per plot for a the first quantile of Moran’s I (I ∈[0;0.2]), b the second quantile of 
Moran’s I (I ∈[0.21;0.4]), c the third quantile of Moran’s I (I ∈[0.41;0.6]) and the fourth quantile of Moran’s 
I (I ∈[0.61;8])





Fig. 8  coalition size per landscape with β = 0.1 (full black dot), β = 0.2 (full grey dot) and β = 0.3 (open 
black dot) for a α = 0.1, b α = 0.2 and c α = 0.3





Fig. 9  Number of stable coalitions per landscape with β = 0.1 (full black dot), β = 0.2 (full grey dot) and 
β = 0.3 (open black dot) for a α = 0.1, b α = 0.2 and c α = 0.3




Fig. 10  Ratio of the aggregagted profit in the GC on the NE’s aggregated profit with β = 0.1 (full black dot), 
β = 0.2 (full grey dot) and β = 0.3 (open black dot) for a α = 0.1, b α = 0.2 and c α = 0.3
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